Salmon Hatcheries as fish Factories: Forgetting the Lessons of Leopold by Blumm, Michael C.
Seattle Journal of Environmental Law 
Volume 4 Issue 1 Article 13 
5-31-2014 
Salmon Hatcheries as fish Factories: Forgetting the Lessons of 
Leopold 
Michael C. Blumm 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjel 
Recommended Citation 
Blumm, Michael C. (2014) "Salmon Hatcheries as fish Factories: Forgetting the Lessons of Leopold," 
Seattle Journal of Environmental Law: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 13. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjel/vol4/iss1/13 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal of Environmental 




Salmon Hatcheries as Fish Factories: Forgetting the 
Lessons of Leopold 
Michael C. Blumm† 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction ....................................................................................... 409 
II. Background ...................................................................................... 410 
III. Lichatowich’s Search For Salmon Recovery .................................. 411 
A. The Adverse Effects of Hatcheries on Wild Salmon .................... 411 
B. Bureaucratic Fragmentation .......................................................... 415 
C. Proposed Reforms ......................................................................... 417 
D. Inconsistency with the Ecological Principles of Aldo Leopold .... 418 
IV. Conclusion ...................................................................................... 419 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Salmon are the iconic natural resource of the Pacific Northwest, a 
region that Tim Egan once memorably described as “anywhere a salmon 
can get to.”1 The Northwest’s salmon runs,  which have been at the 
center of native culture and subsistence for centuries, were the subject of 
19th century treaties that facilitated non-native settlement of the region 
and became a fulcrum in the development of the Northwest’s economy in 
the last century-and-a-half. Today, they have become widely recognized 
as a barometer of the health of aquatic ecosystems.2 Jim Lichatowich’s 
new book, Salmon, People, and Place: A Biologist’s Search for Salmon 
Recovery,3 a sequel to his influential 1999 work, Salmon Without Rivers,4 
                                                 
† Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. An abbreviated, 
unfootnoted version of this review appeared in volume 115 of the Oregon Historical Quarterly. 
1. JIM LICHATOWICH, SALMON, PEOPLE, AND PLACE: A BIOLOGIST’S SEARCH FOR SALMON 
RECOVERY 22 (Oregon St. U. Press, 2013) (quoting TIMOTHY EGAN, THE GOOD RAIN: ACROSS 
TIME AND TERRAIN IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (Vintage Books, 1990). 
2. See generally MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY 
HISTORY OF THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON (Vandeplas Publishing, 2013). 
3. See Lichatowich, supra note 1.  
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claims that the listing of several stocks of Pacific salmon during the last 
two decades has led to spending billions of dollars on recovery efforts, 
despite making no discernable effect on the fact that salmon have fully 
lost 40 percent of their historic range.5  
 This review of Lichatowich’s book first discusses the adverse 
effects of salmon hatcheries on wild stocks of salmon, including various 
forms of artificial production like ocean ranching, net penning, and 
supplementation hatcheries. It then assesses Lichatowich’s criticism of 
what he considers to be bureaucratic fragmentation, and suggests that he 
employs a too-narrow interpretation of the real governmental 
fragmentation that threatens recovery of wild salmon because his focus is 
almost exclusively on fishery agencies, especially those on the state 
level. Third, it asserts that, although Lichatowich’s recipe for hatchery 
reforms seems sound, it somewhat ambivalently endorses 
supplementation projects without much explanation of their costs and 
benefits. Finally, the review claims that Lichatowich’s criticisms of the 
“industrial model” of fish production,6 while well taken, might have 
resonated more forcefully had he elaborated on just how inconsistent that 
model is with the ecological principles championed by the father of 
modern ecology, Aldo Leopold. 
II. BACKGROUND  
 The Lichatowich book suggests that the vast amount of money 
devoted to salmon recovery has been, at least in some substantial part, 
poorly spent. Lichatowich mounts a sustained attack against what he 
calls “fish factories,” otherwise known as salmon hatcheries, and their 
effects on salmon management.7 A highly respected salmon biologist, 
Lichatowich co-authored a seminal 1991 article, Pacific Salmon at the 
Crossroads,8 which signaled the advent of the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) era for Pacific salmon.9 In his new book, Lichatowich indicts 
salmon hatcheries for being the center of a flawed conceptual foundation 
                                                                                                             
4. See generally, JIM LICHATOWICH, SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS (Island Press, 2001) 
(criticizing various salmon recovery plans). 
5. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 30, 51.  
6. See id. at 115.  
7. See, e.g., Lichatowich, supra note 1, passim. According to Lichatowich, these fish factories 
make hatchery salmon “ecologically placeless.” Id. at 23. 
8. Willa Nehlsen, Jack Williams & Jim Lichatowich, Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads: Stocks 
at Risk from California, Oregon, Idaho, and Washington, 16 FISHERIES 4, 4 (1991) (describing the 
imperiled state of wild salmon runs throughout the West Coast). 
9. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species 
Act: Lessons From the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519 (1999). 
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for salmon management, which has sacrificed salmon habitat for what he 
calls a “simplified industrial production system.”10 That system has 
traded away habitat for hatcheries, countenanced widespread 
overharvesting, largely ignored adverse effects on wild salmon, and lost 
sight of the salmon’s essential attachment to place.11  
 Lichatowich’s powerful brief against contemporary salmon 
management is captured in his recounting of a phone conversation with a 
Puget Sound salmon manager—occurring around the time of the 
publication of his Crossroads article. The manager objected to the fact 
that a draft of the article placed some coho salmon populations on a list 
of those in danger of extinction. He objected, not because the populations 
were healthy, but because protecting them would interfere with harvests 
of abundant hatchery-produced fish that intermingled with the depleted 
wild stocks in the ocean. The manager wanted to avoid the “waste” of 
hatchery-fish harvests that he feared the Crossroads article—and the 
consequent ESA listings—might produce.12 This revelation led to an 
epiphany for Lichatowich concerning the Faustian bargain salmon 
managers have historically made with fish factories. This bargain has 
deflected attention from the immense habitat damage inflicted by federal 
and federally licensed dams13 (although Lichatowich is not quite as clear 
as he could have been about the habitat damage due to dams).  
III. LICHATOWICH’S SEARCH FOR SALMON RECOVERY 
 This review discusses (1) Lichatowich’s views on the adverse 
effects on hatcheries on wild stocks of salmon; (2) his criticism of what 
he calls bureaucratic fragmentation; (3) his proposed reforms; and (4) the 
inconsistency of widespread reliance on salmon hatcheries with the 
ecological principles of Aldo Leopold.  
A. The Adverse Effects of Hatcheries on Wild Salmon 
 Lichatowich criticizes “simplified industrial production” as the root 
cause of traditional hatcheries, ocean ranching, net penning of salmon, 
and “supplementation” projects. Ocean ranching, which is the process of 
harvesting eggs from indigenous salmon to be fertilized and cultured in a 
hatchery, rose in the 1970s only to die a couple of decades later, due to a 
flawed assumption that the limiting factor in salmon production was a 
                                                 
10. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 67.  
11. See id. at 23-30, 56-60.  
12. See id. at 57-58.  
13. See id. at 40.  
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vacant ocean habitat. Net penning of salmon, which Lichatowich calls 
“feedlot aquaculture,” is still going strong in British Columbia and 
Washington, with some thirty operations in existence in 2003. Finally, 
“supplementation” projects ostensibly attempt to increase salmon runs in 
the future.14  
  Concerning “supplementation” projects, a strategy embraced by the 
Northwest Power and Conservation Council (Council) and several 
Columbia Basin tribes,15 Lichatowich appears somewhat ambivalent. He 
suggests the supplementation projects’ good intention to integrate 
artificial production with ecosystem sensitivity cannot succeed without 
considerable changes in harvest and habitat management, including dam 
operations.16 However, he does not indict supplementation projects to the 
extent he does the “industrial production” hatcheries, a distinction that 
may well be justified, but the reasons for which are not expressly 
contained in the book. 
 According to Lichatowich, the basic problem of modern salmon 
management is the lack of a sound conceptual foundation, a criticism that 
echoes the critique levied by the Council’s Return to the River: Restoring 
Salmon to the Columbia River.17 This shortcoming is due largely to a 
failure of salmon managers to observe a sense of place,18 which is ironic 
because salmon’s chief characteristic—and what makes the resource an 
iconic one—is fidelity to place, which is a characteristic that has 
captured the public’s imagination.   
 The Council’s now 30-year old effort to restore the Columbia Basin 
runs has been a large-scale disappointment, whose effect has been 
largely eclipsed by a court-supervised biological opinion under the 
ESA.19 Lichatowich does not focus specifically on the Council’s 
                                                 
14. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 104-11.  
15. Compare Mathew Johnson, What Would the Salmon Say? An Argument for 
Supplementation to Help Rebuild Naturally Reproducing Salmon Populations in the Columbia 
Basin, 24 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 45 (2004) (endorsing supplementation), and Lichatowich, 
supra note 1, at 63-65 (explaining the Council’s approach), and id. at 68-70 (explaining the tribes’ 
approach), with Jack K. Sterne, Jr., Supplementation of Wild Salmon Stocks: A Cure for the Hatchery 
Problem or More Problem Hatcheries?, 23 COASTAL MANAGEMENT 123, 140 (1995) (suggesting 
that supplementation proceed “only under carefully controlled conditions at non-permanent facilities 
in an experimental, adaptive management framework”).   
16. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 110-111.  
17. RICHARD WILLIAMS, RETURN TO THE RIVER: RESTORING SALMON TO THE COLUMBIA 
RIVER (Elservier Academic Press, 2006) (advocating place-based management), discussed in 
Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 147. 
18. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 24.  
19. See Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the Parity Promise: 
Hydropower, Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 657 (1991) 
(recounting the shortcomings of the Council’s program, particularly with respect to changing 
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program, although he does criticize its goal of doubling Columbia River 
run sizes for failing to focus on wild fish and their habitats.20 Moreover, 
doubling run sizes would appear as a far less impressive goal if the 
public recognized it would achieve only a 30-50 percent restoration of 
historic runs.21 Lichatowich also does not carefully examine the effect of 
the ESA’s supplanting of the Council’s program as the chief restoration 
effort, although he refers to the “flimsy” nature of ESA protection.22 He 
notes that the ESA listings resulted in a great deal of funding for salmon 
restoration,23 but the inference is that money has been mostly wasted on 
hatcheries and other artificial production efforts, which are harmful to 
wild stocks. 
 Lichatowich claims that reliance on hatcheries to sustain harvest 
levels, which he refers to as the Walmart/Costco approach to salmon 
reproduction,24 has allowed salmon managers to substitute the promise of 
artificial propagation for salmon spawning.25 The result is public 
financing of hatcheries at the expense of wild stocks, causing both 
habitat and genetic loss for the stocks. Further, Lichatowich explains 
how managers habitually establish high harvest rates to avoid “waste” of 
salmon when too many hatchery fish return to the hatchery.26 When this 
happens, mixed stock fisheries are overharvested in an effort to ensure 
that hatchery fish are not overharvested. As a result, the increased use of 
mixed stock fisheries has depleted wild stocks.  
 Lichatowich discusses the relationship between hatchery production 
and its pernicious effects on harvest managers,27 but this is hardly a novel 
observation.28 He questions why managers persist in maintaining high 
harvest levels despite predictable adverse effects on wild stocks.29 But in 
actuality, the results are quite predictable under Public Choice political 
                                                                                                             
mainstream dam hydropower operations); Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the 
Judge in ESA Implementation: District Judge James Redden and the Columbia Basin Saga, 32 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 97 (2013) (discussing the district judge’s refusal to accept the federal 
government’s biological opinion under the ESA and his ordering of spills at dams to facilitate 
juvenile salmon passage over the government’s objections). 
20. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 78, 193.  
21. See id. at 112.  
22. See id. at 190.  
23. See id. at 192.  
24. See id. at 34.  
25. See id. at 29.  
26. See id. at 57-58, 201.  
27. See id. at 59-60.  
28. See, e.g., INDEPENDENT MULITDISCIPLINARY SCIENTIFIC TEAM, SALMON ABUNDANCES 
AND EFFECTS OF HARVEST: IMPLICATIONS FOR REBUILDING WILD STOCKS OF COHO SALMON IN 
OREGON (2000).  
29. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 146.  
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theory. According to this theory, well-organized interest groups with 
both short term economic agendas and economies that are linked to 
commercial and recreational salmon harvest – such as coastal 
communities and recreational sport fishers – are repeat players heavily 
invested in salmon harvest management and consistently prevail over 
unorganized majorities.30 When these heavily invested repeat players 
prevail, wild stocks suffer the consequences. 
 A particular source of the book’s concern is the fate of Oregon’s 
wild fish policy, which was promulgated in 1978. According to 
Lichatowich, the policy was flawed from the outset31 because it included 
directives to both protect and “propagate” salmon, which Lichatowich 
considers an oxymoron—the propagation of hatchery fish is inimical to 
the protection of wild fish.32 Interestingly, in early 2014, the Oregon 
Department of Fish and Wildlife designated certain coastal streams for 
exclusive wild production, restricting hatchery releases to other streams, 
which would become havens for hatchery fish.33  
 Lichatowich briefly mentions the Alsea Valley Alliance case, which 
for a brief time threatened to undermine ESA salmon listings by 
enjoining the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS’s) approach to 
listing only wild salmon stocks, excluding hatchery fish.34 However, this 
case was not as significant as Lichatowich claims. Lichatowich considers 
the lawsuit to be an effort “to prevent change in the salmon story,” and 
he blames an initial NMFS response to the case on the George W. Bush 
Administration’s attempt to undermine salmon science.35 But the 
eventual response to the decision was not as dire as many feared. The 
revised policy reinforced the ESA’s preference for wild fish protection, 
                                                 
30. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION (Univ. Chicago Press, 1991). 
31. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 88.  
32. See id. at 118.  
33. See Bill Monroe, Salmon and steelhead plants will shift on the Oregon coast, ending on 
some streams, starting or increasing on others, OR. LIVE (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/sports/oregonian/bill_monroe/index.ssf/2014/01/post_104.html. 
Lichatowich discusses this sort of zoning of wild and hatchery fish under the rubric of “select area 
fisheries management,” which he considers to be a response to the competition between sport and 
commercial fishers without responding to the underlying root cause of the decline of salmon runs. 
See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 111-15. 
34. Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F.Supp.2d 1154 (D. Or. 2001) (deciding that NMFS 
lacked authority under the ESA to distinguish between hatchery and wild fish once it had included 
both within a “distinction population segment” (an “evolutionarily significant unit” in NMFS 
parlance)), discussed in Michael C. Blumm & Hallison T. Putnam, Imposing Judicial Restraints on 
the ‘Art of Deception:’ The Courts Cast a Skeptical Eye on Columbia Basin Salmon Restoration 
Efforts, 38 ENVTL. L. 47, 70-74 (2008). 
35. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 51-52.  
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but allowed the NMFS to protect hatchery fish, where necessary, to 
conserve natural self-sustaining salmon populations, after taking into 
account abundance, productivity, genetic diversity, and spatial 
distribution.36 The decision also survived judicial review.37   
  As Lichatowich explains, adverse effects of fish factories on wild 
salmon include genetic drift, overharvesting due to so-called mixed stock 
fisheries,38 and a willingness of fish managers to trade loss of habitat for 
additional hatchery production. Lichatowich confesses that while he once 
thought of hatcheries as “neutral tools” of salmon recovery, he now 
understands that their costs far exceed their benefits.39  Given this 
realization, some of his prescriptions seem a bit tepid.40 
B. Bureaucratic Fragmentation  
 One other shortcoming of the book concerns its repeated allegation 
that salmon management suffers from bureaucratic fragmentation.41 
Lichatowich focuses his criticism on fragmentation among and within 
fish agencies, but in truth the fragmentation is much more pernicious and 
widespread. There is no doubt that immense migration of salmon 
provides the ultimate challenge to regulatory jurisdiction. For example, 
the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Council, an interstate 
compact agency with four Columbia Basin member states, has no control 
over ocean harvests (or, for that matter, in-state harvests), no control over 
habitat-damaging dam operations, and no direct control over hatchery 
operations.42  Therefore, regulatory fragmentation is endemic to the 
salmon management problem.   
 A key contributor to the fragmentation that bedevils salmon 
management in the Columbia Basin is that fish managers lack any 
control over the habitat-damaging activities of the Bonneville Power 
Administration (BPA). The BPA is a federal agency that effectively 
                                                 
36. 70 C.F.R. § 37,204 (2005).  
37. See Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming NMFS’s decision to 
change the listing of Upper Columbia steelhead from endangered to threatened and allow the 
harvesting of hatchery steelhead with clipped fins).  
38. See, e.g., Lichatowich, supra note 1, passim (defining stock fisheries as those in which both 
hatchery and wild fish are harvested). 
39. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 100.  
40. See supra text accompanying note 19, infra notes 48, 69-70.   
41. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 77, 82, 86, 119.  
42. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 2, at 132-34 (discussing limitations on the Council’s 
authority, including a congressional admonition that it not become a “super” fish and wildlife 
agency). 
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controls river flows through its hydropower sales,43 a fact the book 
barely acknowledges. The book does contain a brief discussion of 
augmented Columbia River flows, claiming that the increased flows of 
recent years are one of the concessions of the so-called “Lords of 
Yesterday,”44 but noting only that the flows “caused a political backlash 
and attempts to eliminate the entire program.”45 However, at least in the 
Columbia Basin, the ESA has not produced substantially increased 
flows, and environmentalists have been unable to convince the reviewing 
court to order them.46  
 What Lichatowich most likely meant was that that spills of water 
from mainstream dams have been quite controversial because they are 
expensive, reducing the value of federal hydropower sales.47 However, 
they have proved to be quite effective in lowering juvenile salmon 
mortality at dam sites, and spills have occurred only due to federal 
district judge James Redden’s interpretation of the ESA—and his 
persistence in enforcing orders against BPA and allied federal agencies.48  
This essential role of the federal court escaped the attention of the book. 
 Despite that important oversight, Lichatowich has written an 
important book. Among its noteworthy contributions is an indictment of 
the Northwest Power and Conservation Council’s goal of doubling 
current run sizes.49 As Lichatowich points out, doubling salmon runs 
without attention to wild stocks is “inane”;50 moreover doubling current 
run sizes assumes current salmon populations is the relevant baseline to 
measure success. As the book demonstrates, this baseline is hardly 
                                                 
43. See generally Michael C. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific 
Northwest’s Anadromous Fish for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Columbia River Power System, 
11 ENVTL. L. 211, 249-56 (1981) (explaining the mechanics of how hydropower demand affects 
river flows, through agreements between BPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers which 
operates the federal dams on the Lower Columbia). 
44. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 85-86 (assuming that references to the “Lords of 
Yesterday” equates to status quo operations).  The phrase “Lords of Yesterday” is from Charles 
Wilkinson’s reference to nineteenth century laws that often control modern public land management; 
see CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE WEST (Island Press, 1992). 
45. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 85-86.  
46. See Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 19, at 133.  
47. Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 54 (mentioning that BPA’s proposal to decrease spills to save 
an alleged $47 million doesn’t elaborate, suggesting only that the agency offered to use some of the 
saved money on hatchery improvements, and that the offer was judicially rejected).   
48. See Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 19, at 115-45. 
49. NORTHWEST POWER AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND 
WILDLIFE PROGRAM (2014) available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/fw/program/2014-03/.  
50. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 193.  
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relevant; a better baseline would be historic abundance, so the public 
would know the historic context of the loss of salmon runs.51  
C. Proposed Reforms  
 The book calls for changes in the management of salmon 
hatcheries—indicting the current salmon hatchery system and suggesting 
a recipe for hatchery reforms, which includes a prohibition on 
transferring salmon eggs out-of-basin and treating hatcheries as untested 
experiments.52 However, it does not advocate wholesale elimination of 
the technology that has proved so costly to wild salmon runs. Although 
he does not quite say so, Lichatowich may endorse a distinction between 
salmon hatcheries whose goal is to preserve harvests and those aimed at 
restoring historic runs.  
   Lichatowich’s most arresting recommendation concerns his 
proposed system of salmon refuges, which would coincidentally restrict 
their operation through establishment of a series of salmon refuges. 
These refuges would not only serve to zone out hatcheries, but they 
would also cause a considerable revamping of harvest management, 
perhaps redirecting fishing efforts closer to rivers to reduce mixed-stock 
harvests. Lichatowich provides a glimpse of what the salmon refuge 
could look like in one of his “side channels.”53 This consists of a small 
commercial fishery, a sports fishery for locals, and a sports fishery for 
non-locals (controlled by lottery).54 This world stands in stark contrast to 
another “side channel,” which depicts a sterile river in which Pacific 
salmon have been largely excluded to facilitate commercial water sales 
to southern California and Arizona—river flows no longer reach the 
ocean, and “everything is in private ownership,” largely to foreign 
corporations.55 Nonetheless, it is not quite clear from the book what 
effect establishing a salmon refuge would have outside the refuges on 
upstream projects, such as dam operations.  
                                                 
51. See id. at 156-157.  
52. See id. at 168-170.  
53. See id. The book contains five of these “side-channels:” brief vignettes concerning 1) 
salmon introduction on the St. Joseph River in Indiana; 2) logged over salmon habitat in the 
Olympic Peninsula; 3) monitoring of fish migration at The Dalles Dam; 4) at look at what the 
“industrial production” model of salmon management would look like in 2150; and 5) a look at what 
a world of salmon refuges would look like in 2150. 
54. See id. at 186.  
55. See id. at 135-37. These two contrasting visions roughly parallel the contrasting vision that 
Lichatowich paints between the Los Angeles River (roughly paralleling his vision of the future of 
industrial production in channel 4) and the Carmel River (roughly paralleling his vision in channel 
5).   
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 Also included among the book’s proposed reforms are setting 
“ecologically relevant escapement targets,”56 which would avoid 
overharvesting wild stocks. These targets would ensure that there would 
be sufficient spawning salmon to cure “nutrient deficits”; that is, 
spawning required to supply the food webs of salmon ecosystems.57 
Lichatowich advocates for increased monitoring and assessment58 
because a prerequisite to intelligent reform is an accurate understanding 
of the status quo. He also welcomes the increasing use of watershed 
councils as a means to restore a sense of place to salmon management.59 
However, his endorsement of the consensus-based approach of Oregon 
Governor John Kitzabher—an avowed salmon advocate—is curious. 
Lichatowich’s frequent criticism is of bureaucratic fragmentation,60 and 
consensus decision-making seems assured to provide many vetoes over 
any changes to the status quo, which is the very thing Lichatowich 
strongly criticizes throughout the book. In fact, consensus management, 
coupled with the salmon’s immense migrations, is a chief reason for 
many of the problems the book justifiably criticizes. One does not have 
to endorse a salmon expert61 to recognize that requiring consensus is not 
a recipe for salmon restoration. 
 Among the most persuasive of Lichatowich’s suggestions is that, 
given all the failures of salmon restoration measures that date back over a 
century, salmon managers must learn from history’s failures.62 Learning 
from past mistakes would be the first step in finally developing a viable 
salmon recovery plan. Perhaps the chief lesson for the future is that fish 
biology majors need to master history courses as well as science courses.  
D. Inconsistency with the Ecological Principles of Aldo Leopold 
 Another lesson that Lichatowich attempts to draw concerns the 
inconsistency of the industrial production approach to salmon 
management with the philosophy espoused by the father of modern 
ecology, Aldo Leopold.63 Leopold espoused his now famous “land 
                                                 
56. Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 167 (defining escapement as the number of fish that survive 
all sources of mortality and successfully spawn).  
57. Id.  at 62 (claiming that “current escapements are carrying only 5 to 7 percent of nutrients 
of . . . historic [salmon] runs”).  
58. See id. at 155, 156.  
59. See id. at 87, 139, 166-167.  
60. See id. at 119, 172.  
61. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., What a Salmon Czar Might Hope For, 74 WASH. L. REV. 511 
(1999). 
62. See Lichatowich, supra note 1, at 173-187.  
63. See id. at 12, 204-205.  
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ethic,” which argued for an expanded definition of community to include 
ecological function a half-century before ecology became a byword of 
the environmental movement. Lichatowich suggests that learning 
Leopold’s lessons would help the public to understand the idea of natural 
resources as gifts,64 something that was, and is, intrinsic to the native 
approach to salmon.  
 Lichatowich’s book should have explained Leopold in greater detail 
to his audience.65 If fishery managers had taken seriously his admonition 
that land as a community, including dependent animals, is the basic 
concept of ecology, then salmon might have been less susceptible to the 
industrial production model. However, the industrial model has 
dominated salmon management since Leopold’s untimely death in 1948, 
the year Congress authorized the Lower Columbia Fishery Development 
Program.66 Leopold famously wrote that “[a] thing is right when it tends 
to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It 
is wrong when it tends otherwise.”67 If that admonition were taken 
seriously, salmon hatcheries would have faced a considerable burden of 
proof that might well have prevented their unfortunate proliferation in 
the years after Leopold’s posthumous publication of A Sand County 
Almanac in 1949.68 
IV. CONCLUSION  
 In the end, some of the criticisms in this review are perhaps aimed 
at a book that Lichatowich did not write or intend to write. His concern 
that salmon management needs a new conceptual foundation is well 
                                                 
64. See id. at 204-205.  
65. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES FROM HERE AND THERE 
viii (Oxford U. Press, 1949) (stating that “The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the 
community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals or collectively: the land”).  
66. Leopold, a forester, ecologist, and nature writer, was a professor of wildlife management at 
the University of Wisconsin and helped found the Wilderness Society. He died from a heart attack at 
the age of 61 after fighting a wildfire. For a recent remembrance, See Eric T. Freyfogel, Leopold’s 
Last Talk, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL. & POL’Y. 236 (2012).  
67. Id. at 262. 
68. LEOPOLD, supra note 65. Instead of pursuing ecological principles, in 1948 Congress 
authorized the Lower Columbia River Development Program. Over the next few decades the 
program funded hatcheries in the lower Columbia, damaging wild fish, and shifting salmon harvests 
to the lower basin, away from upriver harvests by Indian tribes. See generally JOSEPH E. TAYLOR, 
MAKING SALMON: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST FISHERIES CRISIS (U. 
Washington, 1999). These inherent inequities were partially remedied by the “Boldt Decision,” in 
1974, United States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D. 1974), aff’d 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (tribes’ 
treaty rights entitled them to 50 percent of salmon harvests). But of course the Boldt Decision did 
nothing to prevent the adverse effects of hatchery fish on wild salmon, and it probably encouraged 
more hatcheries to satisfy the increased demand that recognition of treaty rights produced. 
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placed. The fact that he focuses on state fishery managers and the 
hatcheries and harvest management they control is, given his 
background, understandable. But even though he emphasizes that an 
overriding problem with salmon management is fragmented 
jurisdictional control, his prescriptions—which largely look past the 
overwhelming influence of hydroelectric project operations69—are not 
sufficient for a truly comprehensive approach to effective salmon 
restoration.70 That unsettling reality confronts those responsible for 
restoring salmon runs in the 21st century, particularly those in the 
Columbia Basin.71 
 
                                                 
69. See Michael C. Blumm, The Real Story Behind the Columbia Basin Salmon Debacle: Dam 
Preservation Under the Endangered Species Act, 41 ENVTL. L. 1363 (2011). 
70. Nonetheless, Lichatowich’s criticisms have begun to resonate.  The Oregon District Court 
recently enjoined the continued operation of a state-run, federally-funded hatchery on the Sandy 
River in Oregon because it failed to properly assess the adverse effects of flooding the river with 
hatchery fish on wild stock listed on the ESA, violating both the ESA and the National 
Environmental Policy Act. Native Fish Society v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Case No. 3:12-cv-
00431-HA (D. Or. Jan. 16, 2014).   
71. Epitomizing the challenges ahead is the Obama Administration’s proposal to reduce spill in 
its latest proposed biological opinion, despite the fact that previous opinions have failed to past 
judicial muster, and the reviewing court’s repeated injunctions ordering spill. See Federal Agencies 
Squander Chance for Progress on Salmon, SAVE OUR WILD SALMON (Sept. 9, 2013), 
http://www.wildsalmon.org/press-releases/policy-and-government/ (citing a 16-year study showing 
that spill from mainstream dams is the most effective means of increasing salmon survival in the 
Columbia River and judicial injunctions since 2006 ordering spill over the objections of the federal 
government). See also Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 19, at 115-45 (discussing the judicial 
injunctions). Idaho Rivers United claimed that the draft plan “ignores the best science, sidesteps the 
court’s explicit instructions to do more for salmon, curtails the proven benefits of spill, perpetuates 
uncertainty and fails to address the impacts of climate change.” Currently, ID. RIVERS UNITED 5 
(Dec. 2013), available at http://www.idahorivers.org/images/news/IRU_DEC_2013_final.pdf. 
